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Essay

Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely
Proposal
Steven G. Calabresi† and David C. Presser∗
“Sir, in a country like this, it is of some importance that your
judges should ride the circuits, not only to become practically
acquainted with the different rules that govern the decisions in
the different States of the Union, but that they may not forget
the genius and temper of their government. Adopt the system
now before you, and your supreme judges will be completely
cloistered within the City of Washington, and their decisions,
instead of emanating from enlarged and liberalized minds, will
assume a severe and local character.” 1
“If the Supreme Court should ever become a political tribunal, it
will not be until the Judges shall be settled in Washington, far

† George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of Law. We would like to thank Akhil Amar, Stephen Burbank,
John Harrison, Gary Lawson, and John McGinnis for helpful suggestions and
comments.
∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, Northwestern University School of Law. I would
like to thank my beloved wife for her limitless patience, thoughtfulness, and
support (both financial and emotional) over the last several months. I also
thank for their penetrating comments and questions Javitt Adili, Farnaz
Alemi, Brian Hagedorn, Daniel Lev, Benjamin Thelen, and Matthew Vanek.
Thanks also to Stephen B. Presser for his faith and advice, and for being such
a great dad.
1. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 125–26 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith). The
authors are indebted to Joshua Glick’s informative Comment, On the Road:
The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1753 (2003), for leading them to this and the following quote from the congressional debates over circuit riding and for triggering Professor Calabresi’s
memory of Professor Akhil Amar’s comments at the 1996 Federalist Society
Symposium, which are contained in Federalist Society Symposium, Panel
Four: Relimiting Federal Judicial Power: Should Congress Play a Role?, 13
J.L. & POL. 627, 638–44 (1997) [hereinafter Panel Four].
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removed from the People, and within the immediate influence of
the power and patronage of the Executive.” 2
The Justices of the Supreme Court have a lot of free time
on their hands during the summer months,3 and most of them
also have their best years behind them.4 Some, like Justice Anthony Kennedy,5 spend their summers abroad in Europe6 and
2. 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826) (statement of Rep. Buchanan).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“The Supreme Court shall hold at the seat of
government a term of court commencing on the first Monday in October of
each year and may hold such adjourned or special terms as may be necessary.”). Much like a college on the quarter system, the Court is usually in recess from late June or early July until October. See The Court and Its Procedures, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/procedures.pdf (last visited Apr.
10, 2006).
4. At the time of Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s death in 2005, the
average age of the Justices was seventy-one (including two octogenarians and
two septuagenarians). See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 769, 877 tbl. 2 (2006); see also Legal Info. Inst., Cornell Law Sch., Supreme Court Collection: Current Supreme Court Justices, http://supct.law
.cornell.edu/supct/justices/fullcourt.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (providing
links to biographies of the Justices on the Court at the time of Rehnquist’s
death).
5. “Every summer for the past fifteen years, Kennedy and his wife, Mary,
have rented an apartment in Salzburg,” where he teaches a class called “Fundamental Rights in Europe and the United States” to ninety American students and twenty students “from schools around the world.” See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 44 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6. The vacation patterns of the other Justices are quite similar to those
of Kennedy. See, e.g., Justices Let Others Pick Up Tab in Summer Travels, L.A.
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A19A. Taking advantage of the fact that foreign and
domestic universities often pay for the travel expenses of Justices and their
spouses during the summer, see id., six out of nine Justices included continental cavorting in their summer itineraries in 1999:
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a guest lecturer at Tulane University Law School’s summer program in Greece (she traveled to the
Netherlands as a guest lecturer the previous February).
Justice Stephen G. Breyer took on lecturing duties in Austria and
Chile.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made it to Japan for a speech and
discussions with faculty and students at Doshisha University in
Kyoto. She also participated in conferences and meetings in Scotland
and the Czech Republic.
Auckland, New Zealand, was Justice Antonin Scalia’s destination
for a weeklong seminar sponsored by the University of Auckland. He
also taught for two weeks at Hofstra University’s summer law school
program in Nice, France.
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bring European notions of constitutional “interpretation” back
to bear on the constitutional questions before them on the U.S.
Supreme Court.7
This Essay considers whether there is a way, short of a
constitutional amendment, to rein in the Justices’ transatlantic
legal dalliances, while also encouraging aged, life-tenured Justices to retire. We contend that there is. The solution to both
problems is to reintroduce the practice of circuit riding by Supreme Court Justices, which was abolished almost 100 years
ago but which existed for the first 122 years of the Court’s history. We propose that the Justices be required to ride circuit for
a four-week session in July following the recess of the Supreme
Court’s annual Term, during what is now the Justices’ threemonth summer vacation. We note, as Chief Justice John Roberts did early in his career, that “‘only Supreme Court justices
and schoolchildren are expected to and do take the entire
summer off,’”8 and we suggest a partial correction of that situa-

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy made it to Salzburg, Austria, as a
teacher for University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, and to
Moscow, London and Edinburgh, Scotland, for others.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist got his expenses paid for
teaching at the University of London but turned over a $2,000 honorarium to his church.
Id.
7. For examples of the Court’s reliance on foreign sources of law, see the
majority opinions authored by Kennedy in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
576 (2005) (citing, among other sources, Convention on the Rights of the Child,
art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, “which every country in the world has
ratified save for the United States and Somalia”), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (noting that COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES
AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (authorized Am. ed., Stein & Day
1963) (1957), a British report, advised the British Parliament to repeal antihomosexuality laws). Justice Breyer has also relied on foreign sources of law,
such as in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 995–99 (1999) (citing cases from the Privy Council of Jamaica, the
Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Canada, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, and a number of U.S. cases citing foreign decisions
and policies). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice
and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005).
8. Donna Cassata, Roberts Rises to Chief Justice Nominee, BOSTON.COM,
Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/09/
05/roberts_rises_to_chief_justice_nominee?mode=PF (quoting an April 19,
1983 memorandum written by Roberts). At the time of this statement, Roberts
was serving as Associate Counsel to President Reagan in the White House
Counsel’s Office. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
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tion. During their one month of riding circuit, the Justices
would preside over trials on the district courts of their respective circuits9 rather than hobnobbing in Salzburg with foreign
luminaries. We propose to pay the Justices an additional
$100,000 a year to compensate them for this added work, giving them a much-deserved salary increase and making clear
that our goal is to reform and improve the functioning of the
Court. We think circuit riding would get the Justices in touch
with popular opinion outside of the Beltway, much as trips to
their home districts and states do for representatives and senators. We also think the Justices would benefit from knowing
more about the real-world impact their law of criminal procedure is having in the district courts and from seeing the practical effects of the rules of procedure they promulgate.10
We begin in Part I by discussing the constitutionality of
circuit riding as it originally existed from 1789 to 1911. We
show that although there was a vigorous debate on the Marshall Court as to whether the original and very onerous circuitriding system was constitutional, that debate was decisively
and finally resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the practice. In Part II, we consider the constitutionality of our very
modest circuit-riding proposal under modern Rehnquist Court
Appointments Clause case law. We conclude that a modest cir9. Professor Calabresi would like to acknowledge as a source of inspiration for this idea the proposal of his fellow panelist, Professor Amar, at the
1996 Federalist Society Symposium. Professor Amar touched on the historical
practice of circuit riding, noting that “[o]ne of the things circuit-riding did do is
it took justices outside of Washington, D.C. It put them in touch with trials
and with state law and with lots of other judges, and it perhaps created a different perspective on law in America.” Panel Four, supra note 1, at 639. At
this panel, Professor Calabresi betrayed his own transatlantic leanings when
he suggested that in order to put a limiting perspective on the Supreme
Court’s power,
Congress might want to consider by statute doing two things that
Germany does with its constitutional court, and that is to move the
Supreme Court to another part of the country to get it outside the
Beltway. Perhaps, the Supreme Court should be moved to a city in
the Sunbelt. The current Court is dominated by Northeasterners and
Californians. Its decisionmaking reflects that perspective. It might be
appropriate for a major institution of the national government to be
based in some Sunbelt state given that a majority of Americans now
live in that part of the country.
Id. at 636.
10. Cf. id. at 643–44 (comments of Professor Amar) (“Because I actually
think [the Justices have] been over-exuberant in criminal procedure, I would
like them to actually see crime up close, in trials, and not just federal trials for
white-collar crimes but murder, rape, and robbery cases as well.”).
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cuit-riding plan of the type we propose would be constitutional,
although onerous circuit-riding duties might well be unconstitutional. In Part III, we look at the reasons why circuit riding
was abolished, and we show that none of those reasons still
holds true today. We thus conclude that none of the reasons
that led to the abolition of circuit riding should preclude its being reestablished. Finally, in Part IV, we consider the normative case for reestablishing circuit riding. We think reintroducing circuit riding is a good idea for three reasons. First, it would
get the Justices reacquainted with American values outside the
Beltway, much as extensive domestic travel does for Presidents
and members of Congress. Second, it might encourage the Justices to retire after about fifteen years on the bench, as they did
on average between 1789 and 1970, rather than staying on average for twenty-six years, as they have done since 1970. Finally, it would help get the Justices out of the business of importing foreign sources of law into American constitutional law.
We think the reestablishment of circuit riding is an idea whose
time has come.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ORIGINAL FORM
OF CIRCUIT RIDING
We begin with the question of the constitutionality of circuit riding as it existed from 1789 until its abolition in 1911,
and we consider what the founding giants of our court system
said and thought about that issue. Strikingly, John Jay, the
very first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, expressed the belief that the system of circuit riding set up by the Judiciary Act
of 178911 was unconstitutional;12 but when push came to shove,
he and the other Justices flinched rather than insist upon such
a bold claim.13
The original system of circuit riding to which Jay objected
provided for three circuit courts in the northern, middle, and
southern parts of the original United States.14 Beginning in
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
12. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (ca. Sept. 13, 1790), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 89 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also discussion infra notes 22–29
and accompanying text.
13. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 556 (1971); see also infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
14. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
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1789, each circuit court was staffed with two Supreme Court
Justices and one local district judge.15 In 1793, the system was
reformed so that only one Justice, rather than two, was required.16 The cases these circuit courts heard included not only
appeals from the district courts, but also trials of actions that
were brought originally in the circuit courts.17 During the early
years of the Republic, circuit riding took up nearly half of the
Justices’ year, was undertaken at the Justices’ own expense,
and was physically very onerous and at times even dangerous.18 Justice James Iredell, for example, died at the youthful
age of forty-eight,19 in part because of the rigors of circuit riding in the southern circuit, where roads and accommodations
were still quite scarce.20
Jay’s complaints about circuit riding surfaced in 1790,
right after the Justices’ very first season of riding circuit.21 Jay

15. FELIX FRANKFURTER
PREME COURT 11 (1928).

& JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SU-

16. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333–34 (“[T]he attendance
of only one of the justices of the supreme court, at the several circuit courts of
the United States, to be hereafter held, shall be sufficient, any law requiring
the attendance of two of the said justices notwithstanding . . . .”).
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79. Roughly, the jurisdiction of the district courts included certain criminal cases, as well as civil
cases involving admiralty and maritime questions, id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77,
while the circuit courts handled trials of cases involving diversity of citizenship and appeals from the district courts, id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
18. See Maeva Marcus, Introduction to 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 12, at 1, 3.
19. See Robert M. Ireland, Iredell, James, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 509, 509 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d
ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION].
20. See id. (“The physically taxing duties of riding his federal judicial circuit contributed to his death . . . .”); Kermit L. Hall, Circuit Riding, in OXFORD
COMPANION, supra note 19, at 169, 169 (“The southern circuit . . . required
travel of nearly 1,800 miles, twice a year, in a country that had poor roads or,
in some places, none at all.”); Glick, supra note 1, at 1765 (describing the experience of circuit riding on the southern circuit); see also id. at 1771 n.130
(discussing the assignment of the Justices to specific circuits).
21. Jay’s diary entries from Massachusetts in late April 1790 reveal his
struggle with a late and harsh winter storm, in which his “[h]orses [were]
much incommoded by the Snow & wet.” Diary Entry of John Jay (Apr. 29,
1790), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 54, 54. Compared to
some of the other Justices, Jay had it easy on the eastern circuit, through
which travel was “fatiguing,” but not nearly as arduous as travel through the
southern circuit. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1765 (“‘[T]he Southern Circuit required long trips through rough, unpopulated, and even unknown terrain’ at
times in ‘unpredictably bad nasty weather’ with lodgings ‘uncertain and often
unpleasant.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts
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drafted a letter to President Washington on behalf of his fellow
Justices objecting to circuit riding on two constitutional
grounds.22 First, he argued, allowing the Justices to hear cases
in courts of original jurisdiction violated Article III, Section 223
because of the “legal Incompatibility of ultimate appellate Jurisdiction, with original Jurisdiction.”24 In Jay’s view, it was
undesirable for the Justices to hear appeals on cases they had
tried originally in the circuit courts. Second, Jay argued, Congress had violated Article II, Section 2 (the Appointments
Clause)25 by essentially appointing the Justices to ride the circuit courts when this is “an Exercise of Powers, which, constitutionally and exclusively belong to the President and Senate.”26 In other words, the Justices were nominated, confirmed,
and commissioned to sit on the Supreme Court and not on the
circuit courts. By appending onerous and nongermane inferior
court duties onto the duties of a Supreme Court Justice, Jay believed that Congress had violated the Appointments Clause.
Jay acknowledged that there was a distinction between the
Supreme Court as an institution and its Justices. He thus did
not think that circuit riding added impermissibly to the original jurisdiction of the Court. Rather, he believed that the Supreme Court should not sit in judgment of its own members’
decisions on the inferior courts:
We are aware of the Distinction between a Court and it’s [sic]
Judges; and are far from thinking it illegal or unconstitutional, however it may be inexpedient to employ them for other Purposes, provided the latter Purposes be consistent and compatible with the former_ [sic] But from this Distinction it cannot, in our Opinions, be
inferred, that the Judges of the Supreme Court may also be Judges of
inferior and subordinate Courts, and be at the same Time both the
Controllers and the controled [sic].27

Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure
to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and
1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 308 (1987))); see also id. at 1771 n.130 (discussing
the assignment of the Justices to specific circuits).
22. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, supra note 12, at 89–91.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, supra note 12, at 89–90.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
26. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington,
supra note 12, at 91.
27. Id. at 90.
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Jay feared that the public’s faith in the new Federal Supreme Court would be undermined every time the Justices affirmed the opinion of one of their own.28 He cited Matthew Bacon’s A New Abridgement of the Law to show that once
appointed to the greater office of the Supreme Court, the Justices believed of their “inferior” duties on the lower courts that
there was “‘a Presumption they cannot be executed with Impartiality and Honesty.’”29
Jay’s letter to Washington appears never to have been
sent,30 and perhaps believing that they had overstated their
case, the Justices did not push the issue further at that time.31
Two years later, however, the Justices did ask the President
and Congress for relief from “a kind of life, on which we cannot
reflect, without experiencing sensations and emotions, more
easy to conceive than proper for us to express.”32 Their request
contained no explicit references to the constitutionality of circuit riding, but it did represent to Congress, framed as an issue
of policy, the two main points from Jay’s aborted letter of 1790:
[T]he distinction made between the Supreme Court and its Judges,
and appointing the same men finally to correct in one capacity, the
errors which they themselves may have committed in another, is a
distinction unfriendly to impartial justice, and to that confidence in
the supreme Court, which it is so essential to the public Interest
should be reposed in it.33

Many of the representations contained in the letter referred to the “too burthensome” task of riding circuit in between the two sessions of the Supreme Court and during “the
two most severe seasons of the year.”34 For example, the Justices objected “[t]hat to require of the Judges to pass the
greater part of their days on the road, and at Inns, and at a distance from their families, is a requisition which in their opinion
should not be made unless in cases of necessity.”35 This complaint about the onerous quality of circuit riding suggests that
28. Id.
29. See id. (quoting 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE
LAW 736–37 (London, E. Richardson & C. Lintot 2d ed. 1762)).
30. GOEBEL, supra note 13, at 556.
31. Cf. id. (noting that Jay was prepared to challenge the Judiciary Act,
but did not do so “for reasons of political decorum”).
32. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington
(Aug. 9, 1792), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 288, 288.
33. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to Congress (Aug. 9,
1792), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 289, 290.
34. Id. at 289–90.
35. Id. at 290 (editor’s footnotes omitted).
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had the going not been so arduous (especially during a time
when the docket of the Supreme Court was quite slim36), no objections to circuit riding, constitutional or otherwise, might
have been raised. Further evidence of this point is the fact that
the Justices did not initially object to the constitutionality of
circuit riding when it was first imposed on them in 1789, before
they had learned from experience how hard it was.
But the really interesting founding-era debate about the
constitutionality of circuit riding did not arise until the period
between 1801 and 1803, when John Adams’s Federalists
squared off against the Jeffersonians over the issue. In the winter of 1801, months after he had lost his bid for reelection, Adams persuaded Congress to abolish circuit riding and to create
sixteen new circuit court judges, whom he got to pick, to staff
the circuit courts.37 The Jeffersonians were outraged by the appointments of the so-called midnight judges.38 As a result, Congress passed a Repeal Act in 1802, abolishing the new circuit
court judgeships and reintroducing circuit riding by the Justices.39 This Repeal Act raised two constitutional questions:
First, could Congress by ordinary legislation abolish lifetenured federal judgeships? Second, was the re-creation by
Congress of circuit riding constitutional?40 This second question
touched off a heated debate on the Marshall Court, which revealed that a number of the Justices in 1802, including Chief
Justice John Marshall, thought that circuit riding was unconstitutional as an original matter.41 Professor Bruce Ackerman

36. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1764 (citing, among other sources, BERSCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1993)) (“During [the
first session of the Supreme Court] and the following two terms, there were no
cases on the docket and the justices had little to do.” (footnote omitted)).
37. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90–91 (repealed 1802)
(establishing the new circuit court judgeships); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 185–88 (rev. ed. 1937) (detailing the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801).
38. WARREN, supra note 37, at 188–209. Charles Warren quotes a famous
letter drafted by Thomas Jefferson in March 1801 that helped spawn the term
“midnight judges,” in which Jefferson rails against the “‘new appointments
which Mr. A[dams] crowded in with whip and spur from the 12th of Dec. when
the event of the election was known . . . until 8 o’clock of the night at 12 o’clock
of which he was to go out of office.’” Id. at 201 (omission in original).
39. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (repealed 1911).
40. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 176
(2005).
41. Id. at 163–72.
NARD
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demonstrates why the reestablishment of circuit riding was
upheld by the Marshall Court: key Justices, such as William
Paterson and Bushrod Washington, thought the issue had been
settled by practice.42 Professor Ackerman claims the Justices
who took that position did so mainly out of fear of the political
power of the Jeffersonians, who were then riding high.43
Several notable exchanges occurred on the Marshall Court
during this time as to the constitutionality of circuit riding.
Professor Ackerman describes Marshall’s opinion on the issue:
Only four of Marshall’s letters remain in the archives, but all take
the same position. If the justices consulted first principles, the Constitution gives them no choice—they must defy the new statutory command and refuse to go circuit riding. For Marshall, a simple point was
decisive: when he and his colleagues obtained their appointments,
they received commissions to serve as justices of the Supreme Court,
and not as all-purpose providers of judicial services. The jurisdiction
of Supreme Court justices is defined in Article III of the Constitution,
and it does not include a grant to ride around the country holding trials with district judges. Before Marshall and the others could be required to engage in extensive trial work, the president and Senate
would have to appoint them to a second, distinct office. In the words
of his letter to Justice Cushing on April 19[, 1802]: “For myself I more
than doubt the constitutionality of this measure & of performing circuit duty without a commission as a circuit Judge.”44

Professor Ackerman also quotes a letter from Marshall to
Paterson, in which Marshall again expressed doubt as to the
constitutionality of circuit riding:
I cannot conquer [the opinion] that the constitution requires distinct
appointments & commissions for the Judges of the inferior courts
from those of the supreme court. It is however my duty & my inclination in this as in all other cases to be bound by the opinion of the majority of the Judges.45

42. Id. at 165–66 (noting that Paterson’s opinion on the constitutionality
of circuit riding “not only is important in itself but will affect the decisions of
the others”); id. at 169–70 (describing the opinions of Paterson and Washington).
43. Id. at 170–72.
44. Id. at 163–64 (quoting Letter from John Marshall to William Cushing
(Apr. 19, 1802), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 108, 108 (Charles F.
Hobson ed., 1990) [hereinafter 6 MARSHALL PAPERS]).
45. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), quoted
in ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 165. Marshall also declared his willingness to
be bound by majority opinion in his letter to Cushing of April 19, 1802:
For myself I more than doubt the constitutionality of . . . performing
circuit duty without a commission as a circuit Judge. But I shall hold
myself bound by the opinions of my brothers. I am not of opinion that
we can under our present appointments hold circuit courts, but I presume a contrary opinion is held by the court & if so I shall conform to
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Nor was Marshall alone in thinking that the Repeal Act
was unconstitutional in so far as it restored circuit riding. Justice Samuel Chase likewise argued against the constitutionality
of circuit riding in a letter to Marshall.46 Chase also raised the
separate proposition in this letter that it would be unconstitutional for the Justices to return to ride circuit and displace the
circuit court judges appointed by Adams in 1801.47 Chase laid
out at length his objections to the repeal of the Judiciary Act of
1801 and the impending bill that would reestablish the Justices’ riding circuit:
If the repealing Law has not abolished the Circuit Courts, which it
certainly has not done, but has established Circuit Courts in the repealing Act, and also in the Bill intended to be passed, substantially
the same with the Circuit Courts in the Law repealed; and if the repealing Act has not destroyed the Office of the Judges appointed,
commissioned, and qualified under the Law repealed; it follows that
the Offices of these Judges are now full; and consequently no Judge of
the Supreme Court (nor any Judge of any District Court) holding this
opinion can exercise the Office of a Judge of such Courts, without violating the Constitution. Secondly—If the repealing Act be void, so far,
as it intends to destroy the Office of the Judges under the Law repealed, and a Judge of the Supreme Court (or of a District Court)
should hold the Circuit Court, I think he would, thereby, be instrumental to carry into effect an unconstitutional Law. If he executes the
Office of Circuit Judge, I think he thereby decides that the repealing
was constitutional.48

In addition to attacking the legitimacy of the Justices’ riding circuit under the Repeal Act, Chase also stated his belief
that even if they had been given specific commissions as judges
of the inferior courts—which he believed they lacked—the Justices would remain constitutionally precluded from hearing
cases of first instance for wont of a specific grant of original jurisdiction to do so:
I am inclined to believe, that a Judge of the Supreme Court cannot
act as a Judge of a Circuit Court, without, or with a commission. No
one can deny that a Judge of the Circuit Court is an Officer of the
United States; and the Constitution . . . directs the President to commission all the Officers of the United States. I apprehend that, no one
can hold any Office under the United States, without a Commission to
hold such office.

it.
Letter from John Marshall to William Cushing, supra note 44, at 108.
46. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 44, at 109, 113–15.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 113–14.
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. . . The Constitution intended that the Judges of the Supreme
Court should not have original Jurisdiction, but only in the few Cases
enumerated. The inference is just, that, as the Constitution only gave
the supreme Court original Jurisdiction in a few specified cases, it intended to exclude them from original Jurisdiction in all other cases;
and more especially as it gives them appellate Jurisdiction in all
Cases that should arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United
states. But the Judges have held Circuit Courts ever since the formation of the Federal Government, until the late Judiciary Law [of February 13, 1801]. The fact is so. I can truly say that I never considered
the question. I acted as a Circuit Judge . . . . By the Constitution . . . ,
all Judges are to be nominated by the President to the senate, and the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, is to appoint
them. If Congress, by Law, requires a Judge of the supreme Court to
hold a Circuit Court, does not Congress, thereby, substantially nominate and appoint a Judge of the Circuit Court?49

Despite his strong feelings on the subject, however, Chase’s colleagues persuaded him to go back to circuit riding, and he thus
became “instrumental to carry into effect”50 the Repeal Act.
As Professor Ackerman discusses, three of the Justices
polled by Marshall—Washington, Paterson, and William Cushing—argued that the constitutionality of circuit riding had been
settled by early practice.51 Contemporaneous letters reveal the
opinion of several of the Justices that, in the words of one recent commentator, “since the original justices had acquiesced to
performing their circuit-riding duties, the question of constitutionality should be regarded as settled.”52
It was this sentiment that carried the day when, in Stuart
v. Laird,53 the issue of the constitutionality of circuit riding and
of the Repeal Act of 1802 finally reached the Supreme Court.
Having already sat on the case as a circuit Justice, Marshall
recused himself from the appeal,54 as was the unofficial prac49. Id. at 114–15.
50. Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
51. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 169–70.
52. Glick, supra note 1, at 1791 (citing Letter from Hannah Cushing to
Abigail Adams (June 25, 1802), quoted in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 44,
at 118 n.6 (editor’s footnote) (revealing Paterson’s views by including a portion
of a letter from Paterson to Marshall and copied to Cushing); Letter from John
Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra
note 44, at 117, 117–18 (revealing Washington’s views); Letters from William
Paterson to John Marshall (June 11 & 18, 1802), cited in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS,
supra note 44, at 118 n.6 (editor’s footnote) (reporting Cushing’s views)).
Paterson’s views as expressed in his correspondence foreshadowed his holding
in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
53. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299.
54. Id. at 308.
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tice by the Justices when cases they had heard on circuit came
before the Court.55 Stuart’s lawyer, Charles Lee, was the former Attorney General under Adams56 and “an experienced Virginia practitioner.”57 Lee offered three main points against the
circuit court’s, and the Supreme Court’s, jurisdiction to hear
the case, which were reminiscent of Jay’s, Marshall’s, and
Chase’s beliefs concerning the constitutionality of circuit riding.58 First, Lee argued that the Repeal Act, which created the
circuit court and bestowed jurisdiction upon it, unconstitutionally deprived all the previously existing federal courts of their
jurisdiction and stripped the circuit judges of their life-tenured
offices granted by the Judiciary Act of 1801.59 Second, Lee
claimed that the Repeal Act and the Act of April 29, 1802,60
were unconstitutional “because they impose new duties upon
the judges of the supreme court, and thereby infringe their independence; and because they are a legislative instead of an

55. See, e.g., Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 357, 364 (1797)
(Paterson, J.) (“As I joined in giving the judgment of the circuit court, it gives
me pleasure to be relieved from the necessity of delivering any opinion on the
present occasion.”); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 42 (1795) (Cushing,
J.) (recusing himself from rendering an opinion “upon the question of affirming or reversing the judgment of the court below,” on which he sat). But see,
e.g., Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 108–16 (1795) (Blair, J.)
(reiterating his reasoning on the circuit court but admitting that after hearing
the opinions of his brethren on the Supreme Court, he is “of a different opinion” regarding his allocation of damages); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 402, 405–06 (1792) (Iredell, J.) (indicating that though he had heard the
case at circuit court, he gave “[his] opinion, on the present motion, detached
from every previous consideration of the merits of the cause”).
56. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Charles Lee, in ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES 1789–1985, at 6, 6 (1985).
57. GOEBEL, supra note 13, at 582. Only four years earlier, Lee, acting as
Attorney General, had successfully argued before the Court that the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution “supercede[d] all suits depending as well as
prevent[ed] the institution of new suits against a state by citizens of another
state” in federal court, maintaining that “[f ]rom the moment those who gave
the power to sue a state annulled it, this power ceased to be a part of the Constitution, and if it did not exist there, it could not be exercised.” Id. at 740–41.
Lee also argued on behalf of William Marbury in the contemporaneous and
hugely significant case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
where, as a Federalist, he likely expected to encounter a sympathetic Court.
Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L.
REV. 729, 743–44 (2005). Lee was to be disappointed by the outcomes of both
cases, whose opinions were handed down within a week of each other.
58. See supra notes 22–29, 44–49 and accompanying text.
59. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 303–05 (argument by Lee).
60. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156.
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executive appointment of judges to certain courts.”61 Finally,
Lee asserted that “[a] party in [the Supreme Court] has a right
to have his cause tried by [all six unbiased Justices]” and that
“[a Justice] having tried the cause in the court below, and given
judgment, must be in some measure committed; he feels an
anxiety that his judgment should be affirmed.”62
In four paragraphs drafted by Justice Paterson, which did
not specifically address the merits of most of Lee’s argument,
the Court held the Repeal Act and the practice of Justices riding circuit—already acquiesced to by the Marshall Court63—to
be constitutional.64 Paterson reiterated the reliance on custom
in explaining the Court’s reasoning:
Another [proposed] reason for reversal is, that the judges of the supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed
as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is
sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be
shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not
now to be disturbed.65

This was the last time that the Court considered the question of the constitutionality of circuit riding.66 When Congress
61. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 305.
62. Id.
63. The Justices had resumed riding circuit in the fall of 1802, “signif[ying] their acquiescence in the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and in
the restoration of the former system.” 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 44, at
121 n.1 (editor’s footnote).
64. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 308–09; cf. David R. Stras & Ryan W.
Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1397, 1408 (2006) (calling Stuart “abysmally reasoned,” but concurring in
the result on the grounds that “Congress may add to a judge’s responsibilities,
subject only to the requirement of reappointment for duties wholly nongermane to the office”).
65. Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309.
66. After the Stuart decision, the fate of circuit riding rested with Congress, which engaged in a century-long volley from House to House of numerous bills, only a few of which became acts, that attempted to address the needs
of the judiciary as expansion and industrial revolution bequeathed upon the
nation’s courts rapidly bourgeoning dockets at both the nisi prius and appellate levels. See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 30–145.
However, the rationale on which it was upheld—that the acquiescence of the
Justices and decades of tradition had rendered the question moot as a matter
of constitutional construction—has since been questioned in other contexts by
other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir.
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finally did away with circuit riding in 1911, it did so not on any
constitutional basis, but for pragmatic reasons: it adopted the
current system of federal appellate courts and gave the Supreme Court the power of certiorari in order to gain control
over the ballooning dockets of the federal courts.67 Stuart68 thus
remains the final word from the Court on the constitutionality
of circuit riding; and, indeed, the current practice of allowing
Justices and circuit court judges to sit by designation on inferior federal courts69 presupposes the constitutionality of circuit
riding. The fact that many Justices, both retired and active, in
recent years have sat by designation on the inferior federal
courts70 shows that Stuart is still good law to the extent it holds
that Justices may sit on the inferior courts even though they
are commissioned only to the Supreme Court.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OUR CIRCUIT-RIDING
PROPOSAL UNDER CURRENT APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE PRECEDENT
Whether or not circuit riding was constitutional as practiced in the early days of the Republic, and regardless of its
constitutionality as a matter of originalism, circuit riding as we
propose to re-create it today would be constitutional. Chief Justice John Jay acknowledged that other judicial duties could be
assigned to Justices, provided that the purposes of their extra–
Supreme Court duties were “consistent and compatible” with
their role on the Court.71 We believe that Justices riding circuit
1983) (“This early line of Supreme Court authority, holding that unchallenged
historical practice is sufficient evidence of constitutionality, no longer . . .
represents the thinking of the Court. Recent Supreme Court discussions of the
issue indicate that any practice, no matter how fully accepted or efficient, is
‘subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets
out just how those powers are to be exercised.’” (second omission in original)
(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983))), withdrawn, 732 F.2d 111
(9th Cir. 1984).
67. See discussion infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text.
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (2000) (providing that Justices “designated or assigned [to a circuit court of appeals] shall be competent to sit as judges of the
court”); id. § 291(b) (allowing circuit judges to serve on district courts); id.
§ 294(a) (permitting retired Justices to sit by designation).
70. See, e.g., Redden v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 956 F.2d 302 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, sitting by designation on a
three-judge appellate panel); Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th
Cir. 1991) (opinion by retired Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation).
71. Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington,
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for four weeks a year during the Court’s three-month summer
recess would not interfere with their duties on the Court. Nor
would it significantly impinge on their quality of life as happened to the Justices in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Relatively recently, then-Associate Justice
William Rehnquist sat by designation as a trial judge in the
Fourth Circuit without experiencing any of the horribles intimated by the early foes of circuit riding.72 Our proposal entails
a limited amount of circuit riding, encourages the Justices’
recusal from hearing appeals of their own lower court decisions—which has, at any rate, not been a problem with Justices
sitting by designation on circuit courts of appeals—and asks
the Justices to perform duties that are entirely germane to
their duties as Justices.
As one of us has discussed in another recent article, the
key issue as to the constitutionality of circuit riding is whether
it violates the Appointments Clause by annexing the duties of a
separate and new office to the existing duties of a Supreme
Court Justice.73 The Rehnquist Court clearly held in Weiss v.
United States that Congress may annex additional duties to an
existing office provided that those additional duties are germane to the duties of the existing office. Weiss required the
Court to consider whether judge advocates general could appoint commissioned officers of the armed services to serve as
military judges without a separate nomination by the President
and confirmation by the Senate.74 The Court quite correctly
concluded that history and practice had settled the issue.75 Because “the role of military judge is ‘germane’ to that of military
officer,” no separate nomination and confirmation process was
constitutionally required.76
The issue, then, with respect to the constitutionality of our
circuit-riding proposal is whether requiring Justices to spend
supra note 12, at 90.
72. See John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (“Last year, [Rehnquist] traveled unannounced to Richmond, Va., to preside over a two-day trial . . . . ‘To
refresh myself,’ he explains.”).
73. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 4, at 859–68; see also Steven G.
Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES 15, 82–89 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
74. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994).
75. Id. at 174–76.
76. Id. at 176.
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four weeks a year sitting by designation as trial judges attaches
a nongermane duty to the office of Supreme Court Justice. We
think it does not. First, as we have already explained in Part I,
more than 200 years ago in Stuart v. Laird, a far more onerous
form of circuit riding—involving months and months of arduous
and physically dangerous labor—was held to be perfectly constitutional by the Marshall Court.77 After 200 years, it is arguably far too late in the day to revisit the question of the constitutionality of circuit riding, especially when the Marshall
Court thought that question was foreclosed by 12 years of early
practice, and when circuit riding went on for 122 years of the
nation’s constitutional history.78 If Stuart is not to be overruled,
then surely our modest circuit-riding plan must be upheld. And
it seems awfully late in our history for a 200-year-old foundational case like Stuart to be overruled.
Second, in reliance on the correctness of Stuart, many retired Justices have sat by designation on the inferior federal
courts.79 If Stuart were overruled, one would have to conclude
that it is unconstitutional for retired Supreme Court Justices to
sit by designation on the inferior federal courts. A retired Supreme Court Justice is, after all, only commissioned to sit on
the Supreme Court, and so if mandatory circuit riding violates
the Appointments Clause voluntary sitting by designation must
violate it as well. The long-standing practice of retired Justices
sitting by designation on the inferior courts, along with the
122-year practice of circuit riding, suggest that our circuitriding plan is perfectly constitutional.
Third, under Weiss, the duty of sitting for four weeks as a
trial judge is germane to the job of being a Supreme Court Jus-

77. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
78. The era of circuit riding began with the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73, and was not formally abolished until 1911 by the Judicial Code of
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167 (abolishing the existing circuit
courts). The Code took effect on January 1, 1912, and finally eliminated the
circuit courts, FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 134, though a whiff
of them remained in that circuit court of appeals judges could hold district
court, id. at 135.
79. See, e.g., Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1991)
(opinion by retired Justice Lewis Powell, sitting by designation); see also 28
U.S.C.S. § 294 interpretive notes and decs. (LexisNexis 2001) (Generally) (“Inherent power of justices of the Supreme Court to preside over trial courts has
long been taken as matter [sic] of course, and retired justice [sic] retains his
office, all judicial power with respect to such duties, as he would have possessed had he not retired.”).
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tice.80 Justices control the content of our law of criminal procedure and promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure, and Evidence.81 It is important for them to
experience first hand the problems our nation’s trial courts face
so the Justices can do a better job in writing the rules that govern those courts.
Moreover, the duty imposed is not an onerous one. Justices
currently work only nine months a year, on a docket that is
about half what it was fifteen years ago, and with twice as
many law clerks as they had in 1968.82 Asking them to spend
four weeks of their three-month summer vacation among inferior court judges rather than in lecturing with European and
American legal elites is not unreasonably burdensome. Members of Congress travel back to their home districts on a weekly
basis, and the President and Vice President travel throughout
the United States all the time. Asking Justices to spend a mere
four weeks a year in the circuits to which they are assigned as
circuit Justices is not an onerous or unreasonable demand.
Learning what judges think of Supreme Court doctrine outside
the world of the Beltway, the elite national law schools, and
European legal elites is germane to the job of being a Justice.
Under the test of Weiss,83 therefore, our circuit-riding plan
ought to be upheld.
A skeptic might ask at this point whether a more onerous
form of circuit riding than the one we propose would also be
constitutional. What if Congress were really to go back to the
good old days and require the Justices to spend six months of
the year riding circuit? What if Congress were to require that
the Justices travel on horseback or by bus and not by plane?
We think such a burdensome plan might well impair the independence of the Court by requiring the Justices to perform
nongermane duties. Because the germaneness test is inherently one of reasonableness, we think Congress can impose reasonable lower court duties on the Justices but not unreasonable
ones. Moreover, the test of what is reasonable must be in terms

80. Cf. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 173–76 (discussing germaneness in the context
of the military justice system and concluding that “the role of military judge is
‘germane’ to that of military officer”).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (granting the Court the power to make
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence).
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139 (1996); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 34–35.
83. See 510 U.S. at 173–76.
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of what is reasonable in the twenty-first century, in a world
with plane travel and a nation of nearly 300 million citizens.
Just because onerous circuit riding was constitutional and reasonable early in our constitutional history does not necessarily
mean that it would be so today. We think it extremely unlikely
that Congress would impose unreasonable circuit-riding duties
on the current Justices—but were Congress to do so, the Justices would be within their rights to strike down such a law. We
do not think a hypothetical and far-fetched parade of horribles
should preclude adoption of our modest circuit-riding plan,
which, as we show in Part IV below, has several practical benefits.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLISHING THE ORIGINAL
CIRCUIT-RIDING SYSTEM DO NOT APPLY TO OUR
PROPOSAL TO REVIVE CIRCUIT RIDING
Circuit riding as it was officially practiced from 1790 until
1911 failed to work, but for reasons that ought not to prevent
its re-creation in the modest form we propose here. The biggest
objection to circuit riding made early in our constitutional history stemmed from the fact that travel in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries could be difficult, time consuming, and life threatening.84 In his recent history of circuit riding, Joshua Glick notes many instances illustrating the extreme physical hardship it imposed on the Justices.85 A brief
smattering of examples reveals that the Justices had to contend
with flashfloods washing out bridges and nearly killing them
(James Iredell);86 lodging in public houses with as many as
twelve strangers in the same room (William Cushing)87 and
sometimes “‘a bed fellow of the wrong sort’” (Iredell);88 untried
routes and modes of transportation over great distances and

84. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 1, at 1765–82, 1801–17; see also supra
notes 18–21 and accompanying text. For a concise overview of the history of
circuit riding and major changes to the circuit courts throughout their existence, see Glick, supra note 1. For a detailed history of the challenges facing
the circuit courts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with
Congress’s attempts to deal with them, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 15, at 4–145.
85. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1765–66.
86. Id. at 1765 n.78.
87. Id. at 1765 n.79.
88. Id. (quoting Marcus, supra note 18, at 3).
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through unfamiliar territory (Samuel Chase);89 and such hardships as distance and weather that “incommoded [horses] by
the Snow & wet” (John Jay).90 Such pitfalls rendered the circuit-riding Justices’ absences from their homes and families
particularly unpleasant.91
Between 1790 and 1802, the United States was divided
into three circuits: an eastern, a middle, and a southern circuit.92 Travel through the southern circuit was especially difficult.93 There were few roads, and those that existed were sometimes washed out. The only means of travel was on horseback
or by stagecoach, and accommodations could be hard to find.94
Much of the circuit was sparsely settled frontier territory. In
short, circuit riding was a physically arduous task, especially
for aging Supreme Court Justices.95 The physical rigors of circuit riding appear to have contributed to the death of Justice
Iredell, one of the most distinguished of the early Justices, at
the age of forty-eight.96 In addition to imposing these physical
hardships, the practice demanded prolonged absences of the
Justices from their families97 at a time when telephone or telegraph communication was nonexistent.
None of these difficulties would be present today. Today’s
Justices would be away from their families for only four weeks
in July, a time of year when they might even be able to bring
their families with them as they sat on circuit. Travel would be
by jet plane, not on horseback, and Congress ought to provide a
comfortable enough budget to pay for reasonable hotel accommodations. Thanks to telephones, cable television, and the
Internet, Justices would not be isolated for months on end from
89. See id. at 1766 n.80 (describing Chase’s trip from Baltimore to Savannah).
90. Diary Entry of John Jay, supra note 21, at 54.
91. Early on in the practice of circuit riding, the Justices objected “[t]hat
to require of the Judges to pass the greater part of their days on the road . . .
and at a distance from their families, is a requisition which in their opinion
should not be made unless in cases of necessity.” Letter from the Justices of
the Supreme Court to Congress, supra note 33, at 290 (editor’s footnotes omitted).
92. The three-circuit system laid out in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75, was not augmented to compose six circuits until after
the Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58, took effect.
93. See discussion supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
94. See generally supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
95. Glick, supra note 1, at 1766.
96. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
97. Glick, supra note 1, at 1766.
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family, friends, co-workers, or news sources. Moreover, their
circuit-riding duties would take up only four weeks of the year
and not several months. Fifty- and sixty-year-old Justices
ought not to find four weeks a year of trial work to be too physically taxing or onerous. Perhaps such work would be hard for
an eighty-five-year-old Justice like John Paul Stevens, but we
believe, respectfully, that such elderly Justices ought to retire.
Thus, the first historical argument against circuit riding no
longer applies.
A second set of initial arguments against circuit riding was
made in 1790 by Attorney General Edmund Randolph.98 According to Felix Frankfurter and James Landis these arguments “have never been stated more impressively nor more
pithily than in Randolph’s report.”99 Randolph made several interrelated claims. He worried that if they were too busy riding
circuit, the Justices would lack the time and leisure they
needed to become “master[s] of the common law in all its divisions, . . . chancellor[s], . . . civilian[s], . . . federal jurist[s], and
skilled in the laws of each State.”100 This concern obviously is
not raised by our circuit-riding proposal. Spending four weeks
in July riding circuit rather than hobnobbing with European or
American legal elites would not make the Justices any less
learned in the law. To the contrary, riding circuit would give
the Justices real experience with trial work and with questions
of state law that would make them better jurists. Modern day
Justices have a huge staff of law clerks and librarians to assist
them and far more complete briefing than did their predecessors in the 1790s.101 Four weeks of trial work a year would not
deprive the Justices of the leisure time they need to serve effectively on the Supreme Court.
Randolph also objected to the problem of bias raised by the
early form of circuit riding, both because initially two Justices
rode circuit together102 and because those two were then among
98. See Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney General to the House
of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790) [hereinafter Randolph Report], in AM. STATE
PAPERS: 1 MISCELLANEOUS 23 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds.,
1834).
99. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 15.
100. Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 23.
101. See 22 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 401.04 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the roles of the Court’s large staff, including
librarians and law clerks); id. §§ 408.70–.75 (summarizing the Court’s requirements for petitions for certiorari and briefing).
102. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
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the six Justices who heard any appeal from a circuit court decision103 at a time when the Court’s jurisdiction was entirely
mandatory.104 This objection likewise does not apply to our proposal. We would have each Justice ride circuit alone on the federal trial courts within their respective circuits. Most of their
decisions as trial judges would never be appealed, and, of those
few decisions that would be appealed, in only a handful of cases
would certiorari be sought from the Court. In only an even
smaller handful of that handful, perhaps 1 percent,105 would
certiorari be granted and the case heard by the Court. In those
very few cases, the Justice whose lower court work was being
reviewed ought to recuse himself, leaving the case to be decided
by eight other engaged and active colleagues. We think this
would more than suffice to take care of the problems with bias
that Randolph raised in 1790 against the first circuit-riding
law.
Finally, and most quaintly, Randolph worried that circuitriding Justices might be forced to decide cases without adequate guidance from experience, precedent, or books of reference:
Situated as the United States are, many of the most weighty judiciary
questions will be perfectly novel. These must be hurried off on the circuits, where necessary books are not to be had; or relinquished for argument before the next set of judges, who, on their part, may want
books, and a calmer season for thought. So that a cause may be suspended until every judge shall have heard it.106

This is not a concern that would apply to any Justice riding
circuit in the modern era. There are few novel legal questions
facing most federal district courts, and books are to be had for
study at any district or circuit court of appeals courthouse.

103. See Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 24.
104. It would be 100 years until the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,
ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, first gave the Court discretion over its docket. The Act,
discussed infra note 122 and accompanying text, “provided for direct appeals
from the district and circuit courts to the Supreme Court in defined classes of
cases [with intrinsically more important issues], and routed all other cases to
the courts of appeals for final disposition [subject to certiorari by the Supreme
Court].” FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 99 & n.195.
105. During the Court’s 2003 Term, 7,814 cases were filed, of which “91 . . .
were argued and 89 were disposed of in 73 signed opinions.” CHIEF JUSTICE
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
9 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/
2004year-endreport.pdf. In other words, the Court granted certiorari to approximately 1.2 percent of the cases filed.
106. Randolph Report, supra note 98, at 24.
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Moreover, today we have Internet access to the whole of the nation’s federal and state case law, statutes, reports, and virtually
every other public legal and historical document, which makes
vast stores of knowledge available to any puzzled Justice.
Randolph’s concerns were reasonable ones in 1790, and they
even remained legitimate throughout much of the nineteenth
century. Modern conditions, however, render these concerns
moot.
One related fear that critics of our proposal might raise is
that Justices lack the competence to serve as federal trial court
judges because the skills that make one a good appellate judge
are so different from the skills required of a trial judge. We
would respond to this point with several observations. First, for
122 years of our history, famous Justices from John Marshall to
Stephen Field rode circuit and tried cases.107 While law has become more specialized since circuit riding was finally and formally abolished in 1911,108 most of the modern Justices were at
some point litigators,109 so they will mostly not be strangers to
a trial courtroom. More importantly, we think Justices ought to
know more about how trial courts actually work and about
what is happening on the front lines of our court system, even if
that requires that they learn something new. Instead of learning foreign constitutional law with European legal elites, we
think they should be learning what problems are being created
in the district and appellate courts of their own circuits by the
Federal Rules the Justices promulgate110 and their own criminal procedure case law.111 Admittedly, some of the Justices may
initially be reversed quite often in their trial court rulings, but
that could be a good experience for them. They would eventually learn how to try cases, just as newly appointed district
court judges must do. It is our impression that Supreme Court

107. See Glick, supra note 1, at 1793, 1813 (discussing the travels of the
two Justices).
108. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
109. For biographical information on the current Justices, see The Justices
of the Supreme Court, supra note 8.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (bestowing on the Court the power to establish rules of practice, procedure, and evidence).
111. Cf. Panel Four, supra note 1, at 643–44 (comments of Professor Amar)
(“Because I actually think [the Justices have] been over-exuberant in criminal
procedure, I would like them to actually see crime up close, in trials, and not
just federal trials for white-collar crimes but murder, rape, and robbery cases
as well.”).
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Justices are brighter and more talented than many newly appointed district judges who may have been appointed, in part,
because they were the friends of senators. We are therefore unpersuaded by the argument that Justices are too incompetent
to learn how to function successfully as trial judges for four
weeks a year.
A third major reason why circuit riding was abolished was
that the dockets on both the circuit courts and the Supreme
Court grew so out of control that the old circuit-riding system
just completely broke down. Basically, circuit riding contemplated a three-tier federal court system—the Supreme Court,
the circuit courts, and the district courts—staffed by only two
tiers of judges—Supreme Court Justices and district judges.112
The following data, reported by Frankfurter and Landis,113
demonstrate why this system collapsed.
Term
1873
1880
1890

Number of Cases Pending in the
District and Circuit Courts
29,013
38,045
54,194

Obviously, there was no way the old system of circuit riding could by itself be reformed to handle an increase of such
magnitude in the caseload of the federal judiciary. The only
possible solution was the creation of a third tier of judges—the
circuit judges—who could staff the circuit courts and make circuit riding unnecessary. That system is, of course, precisely
what Congress chose to create, and today we have a federal judiciary containing 91 district courts114 with 663 district
judges.115 The districts are organized into 13 circuits,116 with a
circuit court of appeals for each117 and to which at least 1 Justice is assigned as circuit Justice.118 The Justices oversee a to-

112. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
113. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 60.
114. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–131 (2000) (establishing and defining the federal
district courts). This figure excludes the territorial courts for Guam, the Virgin
Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (Supp. III 2003).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
117. Id. § 43(a).
118. See id. § 42; Supreme Court Order of Wednesday, September 7, 2005,
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/090705pzr.pdf.
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tal of 179 judges sitting on the circuit courts of appeals.119
The key mistake of the original system of circuit riding,
which caused that system eventually to fail and become outdated, was its reliance on Supreme Court Justice manpower to
do appreciable quantities of lower court work. That is simply
not feasible in the modern world and has not been feasible for
more than a century. But while circuit-riding Justices would
not have any impact on the docket congestion of the district
courts, we still think circuit riding is a good idea for other reasons that we discuss in Part IV. We thus recommend that if circuit riding is re-created, it should be done not to get more work
out of the Justices but instead to get them in touch with the
problems of the district courts and with public opinion outside
the Beltway and other elite circles. We would emphasize that
our goal here would be to make the Justices better Justices. We
have no desire to reintroduce circuit riding to “punish” the Justices, and we would strongly oppose any reinstitution of circuit
riding that was proposed for such a purpose.
There was a second docket congestion problem that caused
the original system of circuit riding to break down: docket congestion on the Supreme Court, which had at the time an entirely mandatory jurisdiction.120 Again, data from Frankfurter
and Landis121 illustrate the extent of the problem.

119. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000). The following table describes the distribution of judges among the circuits.
Circuits
District of Columbia
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
Federal

Number of Judges
12
6
13
14
15
17
16
11
11
28
12
12
12

Id.
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 60.
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Number of Cases on the
Supreme Court Docket
636
1212
1816

The Court’s docket nearly tripled in the twenty years between
1870 and 1890, a time when the Court had no discretion to refuse to hear any of these cases! It was only natural that circuit
riding could not work under these circumstances. The Justices
could not even keep up with their own caseload, much less staff
another tier of the federal judiciary. This is why when Congress
passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,122 the effect,
according to Frankfurter and Landis, was instantaneous: “The
Supreme Court at once felt its benefits. A flood of litigation had
indeed been shut off.”123
Obviously, today’s Supreme Court has an almost entirely
discretionary docket,124 and while the Court is routinely asked
to hear thousands of cases, in recent times it has chosen only to
hear about eighty to ninety cases a year.125 In fact, the Justices
only hear about half as many cases today as they did fifteen
years ago.126 Moreover, they each have four law clerks to help
them with their work, whereas they each only had two prior to

122. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
123. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 101. This statement is
borne out by a glance at the number of cases on the Court’s appellate docket
from 1887 to 1892.
October
Number of New Cases on the
Term
Supreme Court’s Appellate Docket
1887
482
1888
550
1889
489
1890
623
1891
379
1892
275
Id. at 102 & n.208.
124. See, e.g., MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, §§ 400.05[2], 405.02; Robert L.
Stern et al., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 66
(discussing the 1988 legislation relieving the Court almost entirely of its mandatory appellate jurisdiction); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
125. For example, ninety-one cases were argued before the Court in the
2003 Term, up from eighty-four in the 2002 Term. REHNQUIST, supra note
105, at 9.
126. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 35.
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1970.127 We do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court Justices and law clerks do not work hard: they mostly work very
hard for nine months of the year. The other three months, however, are spent on a lengthy summer vacation that compares to
that of schoolchildren.128 Moreover, that vacation is often spent
in the company of European elites whom we think are a bad influence on the Justices, in part because they represent a decadent, secular way of life. All we propose is that the Justices
spend four of their twelve weeks off outside the Beltway on the
judicial front lines of the nation. This is not an unreasonably
onerous burden to impose.
In sum, the original system of circuit riding was criticized
and ultimately abolished because it was physically dangerous
and exhausting, it deprived Justices of the time they needed to
become experts in the law, it was awkward for Justices to hear
appeals from cases they had tried below, the Justices had inadequate access to legal resources, there was a need for a third
tier of federal circuit judges, and the Supreme Court’s caseload
had grown completely unmanageable. Strikingly, none of these
arguments continues to apply today. The arguments that led to
the abolition of the original system of circuit riding do not
counsel against the modest restoration we propose here.
IV. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
REINTRODUCING CIRCUIT RIDING
As we have been arguing throughout this Essay, we think
reintroducing circuit riding is a good idea for three reasons.
First, it would get the Justices back in touch with American
values outside the Beltway, much as Presidents and members
of Congress keep themselves acquainted with the public
through their extensive domestic travels. Second, it might persuade the Justices to retire after serving fifteen years on the
bench rather than continuing to serve for an additional eleven
years.129 Finally, it would help get the Justices out of the business of importing foreign sources of law into American constitutional jurisprudence. We will say a word further on each of

127. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, § 401.04[5]; see also discussion supra note 82 and accompanying text.
128. This point was made by none other than Chief Justice John Roberts
when he worked in the Reagan administration. See discussion supra note 8
and accompanying text.
129. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 24.
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these points better to explain ourselves.
First, we think that it is very important to get all officers of
the federal government and members of Congress outside the
Beltway and in contact with American grassroots opinion.
There are big differences of opinion, as we know from recent
elections, between Red State America and Blue State America,
and it is the opinion of Blue State America which dominates
Washington, D.C. Right now, Justices are far less likely to
spend time in the hinterlands than are members of Congress,
who return weekly to their districts, or Presidents and Vice
Presidents, who travel nationwide. Admittedly, the Justices do
usually attend the judicial conferences of the circuits for which
they are circuit Justices, but they generally do this only once a
year and for a few days at most. This is not enough contact
with public opinion outside the Beltway to have any appreciable influence on the Justices. They also hear stay requests and
review other papers filed with the Court that originate from
their circuits.130 Once again, however, this is a minimal demand that does not acquaint them with the problems faced by
the district courts or with other judges’ points of view.
Circuit riding for four weeks a year would be far less of a
burden on Justices than that which members of Congress bear
flying back and forth from Washington, D.C., to their districts
or states. Four weeks would be long enough to allow circuitriding Justices to have lots of lunches and dinners with local
federal court of appeals and district court judges from whom
the Justices could learn a great deal. Local lawyers might come
to watch Justices read jury charges, and the local press might
cover their four-week stints back on their home turfs. We think
all these things would be highly beneficial and that they would
make Justices more learned and more modest than their sojourns in Europe seem to do.
Second, in a recent article one of us has shown that Supreme Court Justices are retiring at a much older age now than
they were earlier in our history, and they are serving on the
Court more than ten years longer on average.131 Between 1789
and 1970, Justices served an average of fifteen years and retired at about age sixty-eight, which allowed vacancies on the

130. See SUP. CT. R. 22–23, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
ctrules/rulesofthecourt.pdf.
131. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 73, at 23–25.
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Court to open up once every two years.132 Between 1970 and
the two departures from the Court in 2005, the Justices have
served on average more than twenty-six years and have retired
at about age seventy-nine, with vacancies on the Court opening
up only once every three or more years.133 Many causes account
for this complex phenomenon, and we refer anyone seeking to
understand it to the article Professors Calabresi and James
Lindgren have written on the subject.134 Some of the most important causes are that since 1968, the number of law clerks
per Justice has doubled, the number of cases they hear each
year has dropped by about half in the last fifteen years, and the
social status of their office has greatly increased.135 We thus
think that there are now elderly Justices remaining on the Supreme Court because it is a prestigious and cushy job where no
one has to do much heavy lifting and where there is a threemonth summer vacation. For example, at least one elderly Justice, eighty-five-year-old John Paul Stevens, reputedly lives
part-time in Florida and has plenty of time to engage in leisurely activities.136
We are troubled by this phenomenon because we think
there is a minimal amount of physical vigor a Justice must possess to stay mentally sharp and to perform fully the job of being
a Justice. It was Professor Calabresi’s opinion when he clerked
at the Court from 1987 to 1988 that two Justices, William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, lacked the requisite physical
strength to do their jobs, while another Justice, Harry Blackmun, was intellectually overtaxed by his job. It appears from
news accounts that this problem has not ceased to exist: William Rehnquist appears pretty clearly to have been too ill last
year—the last year of his life—to warrant his continued service
as a Justice.137 We need a way to get such elderly, frail Justices

132. Id. at 24, 27.
133. Id. at 23–27.
134. Id. at 30–35.
135. Id. at 34–35.
136. E.g., Anne Gearan, Rehnquist’s Death Puts Stevens in Charge,
SFGATE.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/
2005/09/04/national/w075007D89.DTL (“[Stevens] speaks in public infrequently, and is not the constant presence at arts performances or charity functions frequented by some of his colleagues. He lives part-time in Florida, and
spends his off-hours playing competitive duplicate bridge and tennis.”).
137. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard
This Term, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A8; Luiza Ch. Savage, Rehnquist Ill,
Making Court Election Topic, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.nysun.com/
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to think more seriously than they currently do about retiring.
Circuit riding as we propose it is a reasonable way of accomplishing that goal. Four weeks riding circuit is a minimal
demand to place on Justices. Healthy fifty-, sixty-, and even
seventy-year-olds routinely try cases in the nation’s district
courts. The work we would ask Justices to do is not strenuous
or physically dangerous. Anyone who is so frail or so ill that
they cannot try cases for four additional weeks a year probably
ought not to continue to sit on the Court. We do not expect that
Justices would like four weeks of trial duty, at least initially,
but it is far less burdensome than what senators and congressmen do in traveling back to their states and districts. We
think it is a reasonable way to put a thumb on the scale and
encourage, without forcing, eighty-five-year-old Justices to
think more seriously about retirement.
Finally, much has been written recently about the Court’s
new-found practice of relying on foreign sources of law in cases
like Lawrence v. Texas138 and Roper v. Simmons.139 One of us
has written a law review article on this subject which shows
that while the Court has in practice cited foreign sources of law
“throughout its history,” it is only since 1958 that it has relied
on foreign law to strike down American statutes as unconstitutional.140 We share at least some of the skepticism that Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have expressed about this
trend, and we believe it is due in part to the extensive European travel that most of the Justices now do during their threemonth summer vacations. We would make Justices spend one
of those three months back here in the United States trying
cases. We think this would be a useful and mild corrective to
their current practice of spending excessive amounts of time
overseas.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that notwithstanding some serious dissent,
a far more onerous form of circuit riding than what we propose
was upheld early on in our nation’s constitutional history. Under current Supreme Court case law, a circuit-riding plan of the
type we propose ought to be upheld as constitutional. None of
article/3755.
138. 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
139. 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
140. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 7, at 755.
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the reasons for which the original form of circuit riding was
abolished ought to cause us today to reject a more modest form
of circuit riding. Moreover, there are important policy benefits
that might be obtained by reintroducing circuit riding. We recognize that we are asking Justices to do more work than they
currently do, and so at the same time as we reintroduce circuit
riding we would also give them a $100,000 annual pay increase.
Reinstituting circuit riding is far less controversial than
passing jurisdiction-stripping bills, and it is certainly less constitutionally problematic. At the same time, it is something a
simple majority of the House and the Senate can do to rein in—
if only a little bit—a very aggressive Supreme Court. We think
circuit riding is an idea whose time has come again, and we
hope the current Congress considers reintroducing it.

